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A B S T R A C T
This paper looks at personal transport futures in the context of greenhouse gas emissions reduction, as portrayed
in documents from various stakeholders in the transport sector. It analyses the role of frames and narratives in
constructing stories of the future, through the lens of two innovations: electric vehicles (EVs) and car clubs. Most
of the documents draw on technological progress to tell stories of a future similar to the present but with EVs or
other low-carbon vehicles, while car club focused documents stress broader notions of sustainability. A number
of economic, technological and political-related frames are identiﬁed, which are used in constructing and jus-
tifying these stories. Some frames, such as ‘economic growth’, are nearly ubiquitous. Narratives support and are
sometimes actively supported by the stories, such as ‘technology neutrality’. Frames and narratives play a key
role in creating stories of the future, and help create and maintain expectations and legitimacy of innovations.
Frame analysis helps unpick and challenge unrealistic expectations that might leave us unprepared for the fu-
ture.
1. Introduction
The future of surface transport is a much debated topic. Speciﬁcally,
the current modes and volume of personal mobility are considered
environmentally unsustainable, primarily because of greenhouse gas
emissions of cars. In the UK, as elsewhere, there have been growing
concerns about transport implications for climate change, but also for
energy security, social exclusion, and public health and wellbeing [1].
Personal surface transport in the UK has for decades been dominated by
a system of automobility where privately owned cars are seen as a right
and a necessity; car-based mobility is linked to economic development;
and norms, practices and institutions reinforce the role of cars in society
[2,3]. This makes the system resilient and resistant to change, as path
dependencies and lock-in make shifting the transport system towards
sustainability diﬃcult. However, there are many innovations which
could potentially make personal mobility more sustainable, from
technical improvements to engines and new fuels, to new models of
transport behaviour and car ownership. Creating future visions is con-
sidered part of the innovation process: it can raise expectation and lend
legitimacy to an innovation, generate support from stakeholders.
This paper reports from a project on future visions of personal
mobility in the UK, in the context of sustainability and emissions re-
duction, and the dominance of the private vehicle. Roughly 25% of UK
CO2 emissions come from transport, nearly 2/3 of which comes from
cars and vans [4]. Two relevant innovations were considered in the
study: electric vehicles (EVs), which oﬀer technological reduction in
emissions, but potentially keep other parts of automobility in place, and
car clubs, which oﬀer cultural and behavioural shifts, including se-
vering the link between car use and ownership. There are other in-
novations of interest, with autonomous vehicles (driverless cars) re-
ceiving attention recently. However, this study focuses on two
innovations which are already well-established in the transport system
and therefore in policy-relevant literature. A collection of 20 documents
looking at the future was analysed; these include forecasts, roadmaps,
pathways, and more. We consider each document to be a future ex-
ploration. The explorations were created by various stakeholders in the
UK transport sector, including government, industry, consultancies and
transport coalitions. The research focused mostly on EVs, as they fea-
ture more prominently in most documents, with car clubs oﬀering a
counterpoint useful for examining underlying assumptions in the nar-
ratives. Another paper from this study [5] focuses on how aspects of the
future were imagined and how the visions served the agendas of their
authors. This paper considers how the framing of the innovations plays
an important role, with frames acting as building blocks in constructing
stories told about the future, and how narratives, which weave together
diﬀerent frames, reﬂect and strengthen dominant worldviews and
agendas. It concludes that analysing the frames underlying the stories
helps unpick and challenge unrealistic expectations that might leave us
unprepared for the future.
Section 2 oﬀers a theoretical background on the importance of vi-
sions in innovation (2.1), and describes the concepts of frames and
narratives and their use in this paper (2.2). Section 3 outlines the
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methodology, including selection of documents and coding procedure.
Section 4 reviews some of the common frames in the explorations,
while Section 5 covers some demonstrative narratives found implicitly
or explicitly in the visions. Section 6 oﬀers some conclusions and ob-
servations.
1.1. Terminology
Internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) are ‘regular’ vehicles
powered by combustion of petrol or diesel. In contrast, electric vehicles
(EVs) are powered using electrical energy, most commonly stored in
plug-in rechargeable batteries. The term EV sometimes also includes
plug-in hybrids, which have both an electric motor and an internal
combustion engine. Ultra-low-emission vehicles (ULEVs) refer to any
motor vehicle with very low emissions, including EVs (when powered
by low carbon electricity), biofuel and hydrogen powered vehicles, and
other technologies. Finally, car clubs are a form of shared mobility
where members pre-book cars for short periods, often paying by the
hour. Cars are typically picked up and dropped oﬀ at the same on-street
location.
2. Background – stories of the future
2.1. Visions and expectations
Stories about the future are often articulated as visions. Visions can
be powerful tools in public discourse and policymaking, because those
that become widely accepted can shape expectations about the future,
and therefore motivate actions in the present towards such a future
[6,7]. Such visions can be considered ‘shared imaginaries’, which have
been deﬁned as “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and pub-
licly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared un-
derstandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through,
and supportive of, advances in science and technology” ([8], p. 6). In
the innovation context, successful vision creation can generate more
support from a greater range of stakeholders (e.g., [9–11]), for example
when rapid technological change is required, “technology promoters
have much to gain by having ‘the public’ on-side rather than resistant to
innovation” ([12], p. 931). More broadly, in order to be successful and
eﬀective, visions must attract credibility through realistic strategies and
tactics, achieving the right balance between utopia and realism, and
also have the potential to be open to new entrants [7].
This paper takes the position that imagined futures are always
normative, as they inevitably make assumptions about behaviour,
economics, technological development, and more. Assumptions about
innovations could include imagining the nature and behaviour of
adopters and users, which could signiﬁcantly shape innovation trajec-
tories in envisioned futures. The visions literature can therefore be
useful even for future explorations which do not intentionally pursue a
political or other agenda.
A variety of research points to the importance of creating expecta-
tions about the future of innovations, partly through the use of visions.
Expectations can motivate and stimulate action on technological in-
novation among engineers, designers and managers, as well as among
sponsors, investors and politicians [13,14]. It has been further argued
that expectations and visions are not separate from the technological
innovation process, but a formative element of it (e.g., [14,15]).
Ruef and Markard [16] argue that actors sometimes strategically
inﬂate expectations of new technologies to attract resources and at-
tention. Once expectations are shared, they eﬀectively act as require-
ments that cannot be ignored by other innovating actors, which can
lead to a period of hype, during which media attention and expectations
peak. A ‘herd eﬀect’ is also possible as technological ‘solutions’ become
more and less fashionable [17]. Periods of hype are inevitably followed
by a decline in expectations and attention, potentially leading to dis-
appointment. While details of this ‘hype cycle’ model have been
criticised, the concept of hype and disappointment is well established
(e.g., [18]).
For any innovation to be widely taken up, it must gain legitimacy,
that is, it must be accepted by a (perceived) consensus of a social group
as matching their norms, values, practices and procedures [19]. Sources
of legitimacy are varied, and can include narratives, discourses, verbal
accounts, and traditional and social media [20]. Legitimacy can be
crucial early in an ‘innovation journey’ for securing investments, ven-
tures and policy support for new technologies, while later in the
journey, legitimacy can maintain public and political support [21].
Maintaining positive expectations after a hype and disillusionment
cycle can be crucial to keep legitimacy intact [16]. The next section
turns to frames and narratives, which underpin the stories that help
create and maintain expectations and legitimacy.
2.2. Frames and narratives
This paper focuses on some of the building blocks of stories of the
future – frames and narratives – and how they make these stories in-
ﬂuential. Frames can be described as conceptual models that help us
make sense of the world, or “basic cognitive structures which guide the
perception and representation of reality” [22]. This approach follows
the cognitive sciences, which suggest we think in terms of unconscious
structures – frames (or schemata), with even our everyday thinking
using metaphorical concepts that are deeply entrenched and culturally
reinforced [23]. Our knowledge makes use of frames, and our neural
circuits mean repetition of frames makes them more ‘hardwired’ in our
brains, connected to emotions and ideologies more than reason [24].
Frames can structure “which parts of reality become noticed” [22].
Lakoﬀ [24] suggests that facts must make sense in terms of the system
of frames of the person hearing them, or they will likely be ignored. In
this way frames might limit our understanding, e.g., we might have the
‘wrong’ environmental frame to understand the ‘real crisis’ [24]. Public
discourse can be thought of as which frames are being activated, and
therefore strengthened. In sum, frames “are principles of selection,
emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what
exists, what happens, and what matters” ([25], p. 6).
A more constructionist approach suggests that people such as
journalists cannot tell stories eﬀectively without preconceived notions
[26]. Van Gorp reviews how journalists need myths, archetypes and
narratives to cover news events; culturally constructed and embedded
frames are part of the journalist’s toolkit, as their symbolic meaning
evokes other stories the audience is familiar with [27,26]. Culturally
embedded frames are ‘universally understood codes’ [26]. In this ap-
proach, the storyteller chooses their frames, and in fact, Van Gorp states
that ‘individuals can mediate the persuasive power of frames by using
them’ (2010, p. 89). The documents studied here are reports and re-
views, but nonetheless the authors do have an audience in mind.
This paper draws on both approaches. Frames found in the docu-
ments studied could be Lakoﬀ’s cognitive tools which shape how we see
the world, often unconsciously. However, they could also be Van Gorp’s
rhetorical devices, with authors choosing to tell a story whilst invoking
certain culturally understood codes that match their agendas. These do
not contradict each other, as the authors, in Lakoﬀ’s terms, seek to
activate, and thereby strengthen, their preferred frames.
Frames are not ﬁxed, but can change over time, and be replaced in
the long term as new frames are born and gain popularity. They can
become ‘reiﬁed’ in various institutions and cultural practices; they will
then not disappear until the institutions and practices change [24].
König [22] suggests two criteria for viability of frames, that is, how
likely they are to become culturally resonant: narrative ﬁdelity, i.e., how
congruent the frame ﬁts with the personal experiences of its audience;
and empirical credibility, i.e., how well the frame ﬁts with real world
events (which might be derived from mainstream discourses). In the
context of new vehicle technologies, Ruef and Markard [16] see frames
as “overarching expectations which place the technology in the context
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of generic societal problems or visions” (p. 324). Such expectations can
direct technological innovation and create hype, as our stories aﬀect
reality. However, if they fail to deliver, the post-hype disappointment
will lead to a loss of empirical credibility as the frame loses viability.
In this study, frames were chosen for their salience in telling stories
of the future, the assumptions or agendas they highlighted, or the dif-
ference between stories that resulted from choice of frame. Frames were
chosen from economic, technological and other contexts, and included
things like consumer choice, technology as progress, and (un)sustainable
transport. The methodology and chosen frames are detailed in Section
3.2.
Beyond individual frames, this paper considers how frame combi-
nations are used to tell stories of the future, and what part these stories
play in policy related discourses. A narrative can be described as a script
structure which shows development in phases from emergence to pro-
blem to resolution, and could be constructed from a repertoire of frames
[26,28]. Narratives are a mechanism by which frames are circulated
and (re)produced, making them a rhetorical tool in construction of
group identity (e.g., [29]) or building powerful stories about the future.
The focus in this paper is on how the narratives told make use of dif-
ferent frames, how they serve diﬀerent agendas, and how they might
alter expectations or lend legitimacy to diﬀerent innovations or other
ideas.
Two broad narratives are apparent from the choice of study: The
ﬁrst is the emergence of climate change and the problem of surface
transport CO2 emissions, which will be resolved through improvement
of standard vehicles (ICEVs) and the introduction of electric vehicles (or
other technologies). This mainstream story is not surprising, given the
role of automobility in our culture. The second deﬁnes the emergence of
a broader sustainability problem, in which cars are implicated, and
there is a shift to integrated transport and away from privately owned
vehicles. This includes ‘car club narratives’, where clubs grow to fulﬁl
their presumed potential, thereby maintaining access to mobility. The
reduction in personally owned vehicles saves people money (beneﬁtting
local economies), reduces CO2 emissions, and also beneﬁts local com-
munities through reduced congestion and air pollution. Other, more
speciﬁc narratives will also be highlighted, as will interpretations of
narratives as ‘hero stories’ [30], in considering how frames and narra-
tives found in the collected future explorations of personal transport tell
stories of the future.
3. Methodology
3.1. Selecting documents
In this project, documents about the future of transport and mobility
in the UK were analysed. The documents include reports and reviews
prepared by, and on behalf of, a range of stakeholders in the UK
transport sector, including government, industry, consultancies and
transport coalitions. Over 40 relevant documents were found through
web searches, journal articles, transport reports, and suggestions from
colleagues. Documents were selected for several criteria:
• They consider EVs’ or car clubs’ role in the future of personal mo-
bility in the UK.
• They contain projections for the medium term future, i.e.,
2020s–2050s, a period long enough for a systemic shift, or ‘socio-
technical transition’, in the transport sector [31,32];
• They were published in 2002–2015; this is a period during which
hype over EVs increased [32] to the point that some believe the
automotive industry has chosen EVs as the ‘winner’ among low-
carbon technologies [33], while car clubs grew from a few thousand
members to nearly 200,000 in the UK, mostly in London [34,35],
and there was a general increase in public discourse about low
carbon transport [36].
• They were suited to in-depth textual analysis.
The study ultimately focused on the 20 documents listed in Table 1.
While not exhaustive, these come from a variety of diﬀerent bodies, and
were chosen to cover a wide range of political, technological, economic
and behavioural assumptions and perspectives without too much re-
petition.
Only a few of the documents focus exclusively on car clubs or EVs in
the UK. However, the documents that focus on low emission vehicles,
road transport or the UK economy as a whole all discuss EVs (or low-
carbon vehicles more generally) as the main route to transport emis-
sions reduction, while only a few mention car clubs, usually grouped
with local action or behaviour change as complementary action. The
main focus of the research was therefore on EVs, with car clubs oﬀering
a counterpoint that helped highlight agendas and assumptions.
3.2. Frame analysis
Coding for frames in the documents was a mixed process of
Table 1
Final sample of documents with visions of future transport in the UK.
exploration (and reference) year produced by (& for) focus
Developing Car Clubs in Scotland [37] 2010 Richard Armitage for Transform Scotland Trust car clubs
Car-sharing in London – Vision 2020 [38] 2014 Frost & Sullivan for Zipcar
A new approach to predict the market… carsharing systems: Case study of London [74] 2014 Le Vine et al. (academic publication)
A Car Club Strategy for London [39] 2015 (members of the) Car Club Coalition
Scope for the Transport Sector to Switch to EVs and PHVs [40] 2008 Arup and Cenex for BERR and DfT EVs
Market outlook to 2022 for BEVs and PHEVs [41] 2009 AEA for CCC
How to Avoid an Electric Shock: Electric cars: from hype to reality [42] 2009 Transport and Environment
Market Delivery of Ultra-Low Carbon Vehicles in the UK [43] 2011 Ecolane for RAC Foundation Low emission vehicles
Leading the Charge: Can Britain develop a global advantage in ULEVs? [44] 2013 Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
Pathways to Future Vehicles: A 2020 Strategy [45] 2002 EST (TransportAction) for UK Government road transport
Passenger car market transformation model [46] 2007 Element Energy and Ricardo Ltd for EST
The King Review of low carbon cars: Part I [47] 2007 Julia King for UK Government
The King Review of low carbon cars: Part II [48] 2008 Julia King for UK Government
Powering Ahead: The future of low-carbon cars and fuels [49] 2013 Ricardo-AEA Ltd for RAC Foundation & UKPIA
Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s [50] 2010 CCC for UK Government UK economy
The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future [51] 2011 DECC for Parliament
Fourth Carbon Budget Review: technical report [52] 2013 CCC for UK Government
Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2014 progress report to parliament [4] 2014 CCC report to Parliament
Future Energy Scenarios: UK gas and electricity transmission [53] 2015 National Grid gas & electricity
Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios – Towards 2055 [54] 2006 Foresight Programme UK futures
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searching for pre-deﬁned frames and identifying frames by recurring
themes in the texts. The goal was to create a list of frames that matched
salient themes in the explorations, helped identify agendas or pre-
vailing assumptions, or diﬀerentiated between narratives.
When choosing or deﬁning frames, it is important to ﬁnd the ap-
propriate level of abstraction. Van Gorp [26] suggests frames should be
applicable to other issues beyond the speciﬁc topic. König [55] suggests
three well established ‘master frames’: the ethno-nationalist frame,
which considers an ontology based on religion, culture etc.; the liberal-
individualist frame, which considers individual freedom and equality;
and the harmony with nature frame, which attributes intrinsic value to
nature. Alongside them, König oﬀers three ‘generic frames’: conﬂict,
human interest and economic consequences. These are all too general
for this study. In technology focused studies, Dijk [56] uses more spe-
ciﬁc attribute framing in a study comparing perceptions of diesel, hy-
brid-electric and battery-electric car engines. These include technolo-
gical attributes such as capacity, noise and eﬃciency, and other
parameters such as social connotation and tax beneﬁt. These are not
suﬃciently abstract, and deviate from the deﬁnition of frames used
here. Ruef and Markard’s [16] work on stationary fuel cells shows how
frames refer to the role of the technology in society, and oﬀers a level of
speciﬁcity and abstraction appropriate to this study.
König [55,22] suggests there is a tendency in frames analyses to
produce new, unique sets of frames, where almost anything can pass as
a frame, meaning creating new frames is better avoided. This paper
follows König’s advice and makes use of Ruef and Markard’s [16] work
in order to reduce creating new frames. Ruef and Markard list four
contexts: society, environment, policy and economy. The emphases in
this paper lead to a partially matching list of contexts: economics,
technology, policy, transport and environment. Further, several of Ruef
and Markard’s frames were used with slight variation as the basis of the
frames in this study: ‘technological progress’ (this paper: technology as
progress), ‘market potential’ (markets), and ‘nations’ (the greater good),
while others were less relevant due to diﬀerence in focus, such as ‘hy-
drogen economy’ and ‘decentralisation’. Where new frames were de-
ﬁned, they were limited to those which represent common themes in
the texts, were relevant to transport and discourses of the future, and
were useful for analysis.
Van Gorp [26] advises using frames that are mutually exclusive to
improve reliability of analysis. However, this study found that using
overlapping frames oﬀered a more nuanced analysis, and notes that
Ruef and Markard [16] use their listed frames in combination with each
other. It is acknowledged that the choice of frames is inevitably arbi-
trary and subjective to some extent [26]. Ultimately, frames were
chosen that either contrast diﬀerent narratives or highlight salient
perspectives in the documents. The list of frames in their contexts,
along with an indication of the narratives in which they are used, is in
Table 2.
Finally, in order to deﬁne identiﬁed frames more rigorously, a
thematic coding method based on Boyatzis [57] was used, as demon-
strated for the identiﬁed frame of technological breakthroughs, see Fig. 1.
4. Identiﬁed frames
There are a large variety of frames in the documents, with economic
and technological the most prominent. This section shows how each
identiﬁed frame is used.
4.1. Economic frames
Economic frames are prevalent in the explorations, with personal
transport seen as tightly coupled with the economy. These frames are
mostly rooted in free market liberalism, and are uncritical of it, e.g.,
assuming economic growth is good and (free) markets mechanisms ﬁnd
optimal solutions.
One of the most common frames is economic growth, often used to
justify or support an innovation by predictions or assumptions that it
will deliver economic growth, new jobs, or other tangible economic
beneﬁts. This frame might be used to highlight the challenges of con-
tinuing economic growth while reducing emissions, as the (former)
Department for Energy and Climate Change suggests in a report to
Parliament:
By 2050 the transport system will need to emit signiﬁcantly less carbon
than today, while continuing to play its vital role in enabling economic
growth.
It can also be used to promise that low-carbon vehicles oﬀer eco-
nomic opportunities, as this report from the independent Energy Saving
Trust (EST):
Establish the UK as a base for the engineering and manufacturing of low
carbon vehicle technologies which could support the creation of new job
opportunities.
While the framing of car clubs as providing economic beneﬁts is less
common, car club focused visions arguably follow a similar pattern,
with innovation leading to economic growth. However, as car clubs are
less established than technological innovations in transport, more jus-
tiﬁcation is needed, as demonstrated in this consultancy ﬁrm report on
car clubs:
[T]he typical London round-trip car-sharing member that disposes/defers
car ownership saves £3,000 per year… This cost saving releases more
disposable income that can be used more productively in the local London
economy.
Another common frame can be called markets, a framing that as-
sumes market activity will ﬁnd the ‘best’ solution or alternative among
several (technological) options. It follows that creating markets is a
vital step, as expressed by the Government commissioned ‘King Review’
of low-carbon cars (Part 2):
… bringing existing low emission technologies from “the shelf to the
showroom” as quickly as possible” and “ensuring a market for these low
emission vehicles”.
Further, markets must be maintained through avoiding uncertainty
and reassuring consumers, as a report from the thinktank Institute for
Public Policy Research highlights:
This creates uncertainty for the ULEV market, as potential consumers
need to know that their purchase is contributing to the decarbonisation of
the economy.
Finally, consumer choice is a frame which presents choice as an in-
violable right, tied to notions of (individual) freedom; however, many
Table 2
Frames identiﬁed and deﬁned in the explorations and their use in the two general nar-
ratives and the technology neutrality narrative.







markets yes no yes







political the greater good some yes no
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explorations eﬀectively limit consumer choice to choice of vehicle
purchased. This frame is often used in modelling, where consumer
choice is a proxy for behaviour, and used to calculate future projections
or results of proposed interventions. In these models consumers are
often framed as rational economic actors, as in this modelling exercise
from the EST:
It is then assumed that each consumer makes an assessment of the var-
ious attributes of the vehicles, to deﬁne an overall score (or utility) for
each vehicle. The consumer chooses the vehicle with the maximum utility.
Choice is sometimes invoked as a reason for intervention, e.g., en-
abling new technologies to reach markets so consumers can choose
between them, as in the King Review quote above. On the other hand, it
is sometimes invoked as a reason for lack of intervention. For example,
regarding car clubs, the King Review argues for ‘promotion’, but not
market creation:
Promotion of car clubs by central government could increase awareness
and enable people to make informed decisions over whether car clubs
could be appropriate for them personally.
This suggests an underlying agenda of techno-optimism, where
technological innovations are considered central to reducing emissions,
but other shifts to more sustainable modes of behaviour are marginal.
The seeming frustration at lack of EV uptake (see 5.2) strengthens the
idea that low carbon vehicles are seen as the ‘correct’ choice for con-
sumers.
4.2. Technological frames
Technology as progress is a frame in which technological develop-
ment, and especially innovation, is seen as synonymous with (bene-
ﬁcial) progress. Ruef and Markard [16] have a similar frame ‘techno-
logical progress’, which also suggests a ‘better future world’, as progress
is assumed to be purely positive.
One of the uses of this frame is the assumption that challenges can
and will be solved with technological solutions. This focus on techno-
logical solutions marginalises other policy options, such as behaviour
change or cultural shift, as irrelevant, unnecessary or extremely diﬃ-
cult. For example, a modelling exercise commissioned by the former
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the
Department for Transport [40] projects emission futures as EVs and
hybrids penetrate the market, but the projections do not change car
demand, mileage or journey proﬁles, despite discussing the geography
of EV spread (from urban centres outwards). Similarly, the Energy
Saving Trust [46] model the uptake of diﬀerent low-carbon vehicles
under diﬀerent policy scenarios; despite a wide range of parameters,
consumer behaviour is modelled only in choice of car purchase. While
these explorations acknowledge the limitations of their models, the
framing of emissions reduction through market transformation to low-
carbon vehicles, with no social or cultural changes, ignores the co-
evolution of norms and practices with technology [58].
Technology as progress reassures us that even if one technology
fails, another will succeed. For example, the Committee on Climate
Change [50] analyses EVs’ potential, but then suggests that if EVs prove
unsuccessful through 2030, hydrogen vehicles will penetrate the
market more. These ideas support – and are supported by – a narrow
deﬁnition of sustainable transport as reduction in carbon emissions (see
4.4).
A diﬀerent frame could be called technological breakthrough. This is a
frame which casts doubt on the ability of technology to deliver, until
some – usually unlikely – breakthrough is achieved, i.e., current tech-
nologies are insuﬃcient or insuﬃciently developed for the predicted or
desired vision of the future. This frame applies speciﬁcally to plausible
but uncertain futures, highlighting the non-trivial advances that as-
sumptions about the future might make.
This might seem incongruous with the general techno-optimism of
many visions, but this frame is applied to speciﬁc technologies, used to
cast doubt on their ability to deliver, but not the ability of technology as
a whole to succeed. Nonetheless, there is a certain irony in invoking
notions of technological failure, or the endless wait for a breakthrough,
in techno-optimistic explorations.
This frame is sometimes used to stress uncertainty or cast doubt
about the future of a given (technological) innovation to become
widespread and mainstream. Doubt about EVs’ potential is present in
some of the earlier of the explorations in this study, e.g.:
[D]espite decades of battery development… Outside niche markets, the
future of the electric car does not appear optimistic… Struggles with the
development of dedicated battery cars, have led car manufacturers to
Fig. 1. Coding method example for the frame technological break-
throughs, based on Boyatzis [57].
N. Bergman Energy Research & Social Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
divert their eﬀorts…
Some explorations suggest shorter term emission targets can be fully
met through improvements to internal combustion engine vehicles
(ICEVs), using the uncertainty around ultra-low emissions vehicles
(ULEVs) to strengthen the message. In the longer term, ULEVs might be
inevitable, and the same framing of technological breakthrough is
sometimes used to stress great potential and great challenges ahead, as
the King Review (Part 1) demonstrates:
In the longer term, possibly by 2050, almost complete decarbonisation of
road transport is possible. This will require breakthroughs in battery and/
or hydrogen technology and a zero-carbon power source for these ve-
hicles.
Bucking the trend of technological optimism is the Foresight1 work
[54], in which drivers and trends of transport futures were developed in
workshops with “Experts from the research community, business and
the public sector” (p. 1). Scenarios were based on two key uncertainties:
whether low-environment-impact transport systems would be devel-
oped and whether people would accept intelligent infrastructure, which
could respond ‘autonomously and intelligently’. This outlier contradicts
assumptions made in most of the explorations: that technological pro-
gress will necessarily prevail, and that people will accept it. These
stories dare present technological failure and even dystopian futures, in
sharp contrast to all other explorations.
A technological narrative implicitly drawn on but not discussed is
the linear model of technological innovation and diﬀusion. This model
suggests that innovation follows a linear route, beginning with basic
research, followed by applied research and development, and ending
with production and diﬀusion (e.g., [59]). This narrative is a powerful
rhetorical tool, connecting several themes together. For example, in the
studied explorations, development of EVs (or other low-carbon cars) is
a preliminary requirement (technological breakthrough) before market-
isation (markets), with barriers to uptake, or demand more broadly,
addressed last (consumer choice). The linear model has been critiqued
for, among other things, drawing a strong distinction between the social
and the technical, and thereby lacking the socio-technical context in
which technological innovation happens [60], but is nonetheless widely
used. While it is not universally understood, and too speciﬁc for this
paper’s deﬁnition of a frame, in some contexts it might act as one, as
“[i]t is a thought ﬁgure that simpliﬁes and aﬀords administrators and
agencies a sense of orientation when it comes to thinking about allo-
cation of funding to R &D” ([59], p. 659).
4.3. Political frames
Two related political frames are identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is the greater
good, which frames action as something that ‘should’ be done. It is
marked by an appeal to national or local pride, such as London’s
transport reputation:
London’s transportation network is regularly benchmarked globally,
having consistently invested in and promoted sustainable mobility in-
itiatives that have achieved modal shift away from the private car to
sustainable travel, public transport in particular.
It can also be a call of duty or a call for leadership, as when the King
Review tells us that:
The UK can and should lead by example….
Ruef and Markard [16] have a similar frame ‘nations’, which focuses
on the opportunity for a nation to stay competitive.
Beyond this general call for action, there is a more speciﬁc frame of
responsibility, which allocates roles to actors from diﬀerent sectors (e.g.,
politicians, local oﬃcials, car manufacturers, funding bodies), makes
speciﬁc policy recommendations, or simply calls for actors to ‘do their
part’. This frame appears most commonly in reports for the govern-
ment, such as the EST and the King Review:
[P]olicy recommendations aimed at ensuring that government, industry,
the research community and consumers all contribute to reducing carbon
emissions from cars…
4.4. Transport and sustainability frames
The majority of the explorations frame transport as continued auto-
mobility, seeing the future very much as the present in terms of mobility
dominated by privately-owned cars, with high transport demand.
Explorations which use this frame analyse the future in terms of the
changes in vehicle technology or fuel, with projections of future emis-
sions calculated from uptake of EVs or other low-carbon vehicles and
improvements to ICEVs. Other changes, such as modal shifts or reduced
travel, are considered complementary or marginal in eﬀect.
Sustainability is portrayed as predominantly about reducing green-
house gas emissions, allowing high demand to continue, as long as cars
can be made ‘low-carbon’.
A competing frame might be called (un)sustainable transport,
framing current transport as unsustainable beyond the need for emis-
sions reduction – not surprisingly used in car club related explorations.
In this frame, the current transport regime and trends are framed as
problematic, due to congestion, air pollution, equity and accessibility,
future population growth and more. This implies that reducing car
numbers and usage is desirable or even necessary, as this report from
Transform Scotland2 puts it:
The essential prerequisites for expanding car club membership in
Scotland… [include] addressing the need for changes in attitudes in our
“car culture”.
However, the explorations that use this frame stop short of calling
for a car free culture, as the London based Car Club Coalition shows:
Car clubs will play an important role in reducing the need to have a car
because they oﬀer an alternative to conventional car use models and can
reduce habitual car use while still enabling access to a car for essential
journeys.
This section showed how individual frames reﬂect worldviews, as-
sumptions and agendas, and how these come into play in building
stories of the future visions. The next section considers putting frames
together in those stories.
5. Narratives
This section looks beyond individual frames to consider how nar-
ratives weave frames together into powerful discourse. The aim is to
show how they are used by diﬀerent actors, and to analyse how dif-
ferent frames are used in constructing them. Three examples of narra-
tives are highlighted, which might be called the good, the bad and the
neutral.
5.1. The good: narratives of success
A recurrent theme in the explorations is the story of success. The
scenarios and projections almost always detail the ‘good news’, i.e.,
how targets and challenges can be met, or how innovations will suc-
ceed. The narratives are often excused as heuristic tools and not
1 Foresight projects work with government departments, experts and academics to
identify where new or emerging science can help make policies that are more resilient to
the future.
2 Transform Scotland researches and campaigns for socially and environmentally sus-
tainable transport.
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predictions, but nonetheless there is a noticeable lack of scenarios that
detail missing emission reduction targets, and how such situations
might be dealt with (which also have heuristic value).
Reducing emissions is often framed as a diﬃcult challenge, which
can be met through strong action. For example, the Committee on
Climate Change reports to Parliament that:
The fact that electric (and other ultra-low emission) vehicles play a
potentially major role in moving to a low-carbon economy therefore
poses a challenge … However, there are a number of promising devel-
opments which provide conﬁdence that this challenge can be addressed.
These narratives invoke political frames such as the greater good and
responsibility, but as always, economics are important, with consumer
choice and economic growth frames used, for example:
The key challenge in transport is decarbonising travel in a way that is
both cost eﬀective and acceptable to consumers.
One of the challenges these stories face is the electricity grid itself,
and its carbon emissions, as in this consultancy report on the future of
low-carbon cars and fuels:
And then there is their future greenhouse gas reduction potential, which
relies largely on decarbonisation of the grid. Although this is strongly
implied by the Climate Change Act 2008, it cannot be accepted as a given
…
While these narratives do not promise success, in not discussing the
possibility of failure, they seem to suggest that a shift away from fossil
fuel vehicles is inevitably on the way, despite presenting it as a chal-
lenging task. This could be explained by the need to raise expectations
and gain legitimacy and support for innovations in low-carbon vehicle
technology, or more broadly to create shared visions of the future
(imaginaries) in which these vehicles succeed both in reducing emis-
sions from surface transport and in maintaining the automobility
system.
The success stories could be classiﬁed as hero stories in which society
is saved by new technologies; the technologies themselves are the hero
[30]. Janda and Topouzi draw on Vogler’s [61] modernised map of a
hero’s journey (inspired in turn by Campbell [62]). An early stage in the
journey is ‘crossing the threshold’, when the hero commits to the
challenge, leaving the ‘ordinary world’ for a ‘special world’ with un-
familiar rules. Janda and Topouzi interpret this as the ‘imaginary world’
of technical potential. The success narratives, which draw on techno-
logical promise and pay less attention to social context and behaviour,
match this interpretation well as ‘there is no need for people to change
because the technology will make the necessary changes for us’ ([30],
p. 519).
A notable exception to the success stories comes from the National
Grid [53] exploration, which focuses on electricity use throughout the
UK economy (including EVs). It provides four scenarios according to
higher or lower future prosperity and higher or lower social ambition to
decarbonise the economy. Only one scenario, where society is en-
vironmentally engaged with higher prosperity, leads to meeting the
UK’s emission reduction targets on time. The IPPR report, which uses
the National Grid’s scenarios, is more candid than most about the dif-
ﬁculties in meeting the targets:
Representatives from the automotive industry expressed frustration at the
rate of progress of the energy industry in preparing the UK for a tran-
sition towards ultra-low emission vehicles… [The energy industry] ex-
pressed frustration that ULEVs are not designed with the UK electricity
network in mind.
These setback stories could be seen as learning stories [30]: these
take place in the messy real world, with protagonists who are normal
people rising to a challenge. In the energy context, the learning story
happens in the gap between technical potential and what is actually
achieved [30].
Car club explorations also use narratives of success. First, in an
optimistic portrayal that car clubs will grow and prosper, even without
policy support, and more so with support. There appears to be some
hype in the predictions, as one exploration [39] looks at scenarios for
500,000 members in Greater London by 2020, and a ‘more ambitious’ 1
million users by 2025. In Scotland [37], projections for 2014/15 of up
to 13,000 members without policy support proved overly optimistic,
with actual numbers around 7600 [35]. Second, these narratives build
on the (un)sustainable transport frame in emphasising how car club
success could deliver sustainability – a future with fewer cars but high
access to multi-modal mobility, with diverse social, environmental and
economic beneﬁts.
Again, this optimism could be explained by the need to create ex-
pectations and gain support for car clubs (as an innovation). The
marginal role car clubs play in most of the explorations, despite having
more users than there are EVs on the roads, suggests they have less
legitimacy as a ‘proper’ form of transport that can play a part in a shift
to sustainability.
5.2. The bad: frustration of failure
An implicit theme emerging in some of the more recent explorations
is addressing low sales numbers of EVs, with narratives suggesting this
is a ‘demand side problem’, and attempting to understand the lack of
consumer uptake. An exploration from consultancy Ecolane [43] ex-
presses this most clearly, claiming that car manufacturers are rising to
the challenge of delivering low-carbon cars for the future, and that
consumer demand must now be addressed. This logic limits behaviour
to choice of car purchased, and is in line with the linear diﬀusion model
(see 4.2), portraying the technological innovation process as separate
from the socio-cultural process of diﬀusion, with the need to tackle
‘barriers’ to uptake – both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial.
Some attempts to understand low uptake use the economic frames
of market solutions and consumer choice, suggesting failure to purchase
EVs is due to their high upfront cost and consumers having ‘high dis-
count rates’. There seems to be – in explorations written by or for
government – frustration that consumers are not behaving as rational
actors: they fail to recognise future savings from EVs’ low running costs.
This behaviour is described as ‘sub-optimal’ [48] or ‘myopic’ [50], as
purchasing an EV would seem to be ‘in their own interests’ [47]. On the
other hand, several explorations highlight the fact that consumer pur-
chase of vehicles does not follow the rational economic model, as they
value certain vehicle features even if these do not give signiﬁcant
savings [41,49]. In addition, brand loyalty and symbolism such as
status and identity play a role in car choice [43,4].
More recent explorations problematise users in another way. While
the range of EVs (distance before recharging) is portrayed as a barrier
throughout, only a few recent (2013–2015) explorations use the phrase
‘range anxiety’, portraying this squarely as a user issue rather than a
technical challenge. This dichotomy is also found in how users are
framed in a recent Norwegian study on stakeholders’ imagining of EV
users [63]: on the one hand, users were portrayed as rational actors
concerned with cost, but on the other, range anxiety was believed to be
a major concern – and was seen as an irrational fear, a psychological
barrier that would disappear with experience of EV use. This dual
framing of the public is discussed by Barnett et al. [64], who contrast
public concerns that could be addressed, which were seen as under-
standable or rational, such as cost and performance, with situations
where the public was seen as ‘blinkered’ or having ‘misconceptions’, of
which range anxiety could be an example.
The inconsistent framing of people indicates clinging to certain
frames or narratives that have lost empirical credibility [22] – a sign of
not accepting facts that do not match their system of frames [24]. There
also appears to be an element of the automotive industry shifting risk
and responsibility by portraying the lack of uptake of low emission
vehicles as a problem for the state or civil society, whilst still portraying
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behaviour narrowly as choice of vehicle. The EV hype from 2005 on-
wards [32] might have met disillusionment due to low sales in fol-
lowing years, so shifting perception to present the technologies and
industry as successful might help maintain the positive frames and le-
gitimacy needed [16,21] for ongoing political and stakeholder support.
Going back to the hero’s journey [62,61]: in the ﬁnal stages of the
story, the hero returns to the ‘ordinary world’ and faces last minute
dangers. The frustration at lack of demand could be interpreted as a
ﬁnal test after the demons were thought to be conquered. The pro-
blematisation of users after manufacturers rose to the challenge could
even be seen as the ‘puriﬁcation’ of the hero: the technology is ﬂawless
and must not be tainted by the users. Alternatively, the frustration
could be seen as part of a learning story [30], as the ideal technologies
encounter the real world.
5.3. The neutral: technology
Several documents refer to the importance of government, or gov-
ernment policy, being ‘technology neutral’. Technology neutrality is a
narrative in which policies and regulations should not choose winners
among technologies oﬀering essentially similar services or solutions, as
the markets can – and will – choose the most successful options. In our
context, this means the best options of the fuel and engine technologies
available to deliver a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions will win
out. Several explorations written by and for government, or by con-
sultancies, suggest the automotive industry supports technology neu-
trality [45,48,47,40,49], e.g.:
There is a strong sentiment in the vehicle manufacturing community that
interventions by Government should be technology neutral.
Some government written documents, in turn, support this call
[50,51]:
We cannot say for sure which technologies will emerge as the most ef-
fective means of decarbonising car travel, so it is essential that the
Government takes a technology neutral approach, allowing us to achieve
emissions reductions in the most cost eﬀective way.
The conscious, active reinforcement and reassurance of this narra-
tive are what distinguish it from a frame: frames do not require justi-
ﬁcation and explanation. Unpacking the narrative suggests it frames
sustainable transport narrowly as reducing emissions, and relies on
frames including: technology as progress, continued automobility, markets,
and consumer choice. It also links to the hesitation of the state to pick
winners in a free market paradigm, perhaps invoking bad experiences
of the state picking early winners in the past. This can be seen, for
example, in calls to gradually reduce tailpipe emission targets or reg-
ulations (e.g., [4]), allowing for ICEV improvements alongside uptake
of EVs and other ULEVs, rather than show explicit support for EVs.
Hesitation to back EVs has been observed in Sweden as well [65].
While technology neutrality could be seen as simple prudence in the
face of unknown development, it is important to recognise that it is a
policy that favours incumbent ﬁrms and established technologies which
do not require public support. It could be seen as a delaying tactic
protecting ICEVs in the short term. In addition, the dialogue between
policymakers and industry reinforces the current transport regime [66].
Overall, there is much to suggest that this narrative is a political tool
serving agendas of incumbent powerful actors.
6. Discussion and conclusions
This paper reviews frames and narratives used in explorations of
personal transport futures in the UK, considering perspectives from
frame analysis, visions and expectations, and stories of the future. This
section oﬀers some summarising thoughts and conclusions.
There are, not surprisingly, diﬀerences between the stories told by
incumbents in what might be considered a ‘central narrative’ of the
future, and alternative stories, such as car club narratives. The central
narrative portrays the future as an unbroken continuation of the past
and present, including continued car culture and high transport de-
mand, relying on technological progress to meet a narrowly deﬁned
sustainability agenda. This story relies on several frames as building
blocks – economic growth, technological progress, consumer choice,
and automobility, and invokes political and technological narratives
such as the ‘linear model’ and ‘technology neutrality’. It creates nar-
ratives of success which tend to reinforce incumbent power whilst
promising sustainability in the form of lower emissions. By contrast, car
club focused visions discuss integrated transport yielding local and
national beneﬁts, with greater change to how (and how much) we
travel, building on frames of economic growth and consumer choice,
but questioning frames of automobility and narrow deﬁnitions of sus-
tainability, and hardly relying on technological progress.
Systems of frames underlie political ideologies, worldviews and
moral codes [23,24]. Lakoﬀ’s work suggests that in (US) politics, con-
servatives make better use than liberals of a uniﬁed, self-reinforcing
worldview, through long-term framing of issues, connecting the
rhetorical and the cognitive [23,67]. This paper shows how diﬀerent
frames are used together in stories of the future, relying on and re-
inforcing each other. Most important is the belief of strong links be-
tween technology, mobility and the market economy, best expressed in
the King Review:
Technological progress has been fundamental to furthering the universal
objectives of growth and mobility. It has also enabled a major, global
industry to prosper in its own right.
This, then, is the reinforcement of an entire worldview through the
repeated framing of issues. This ‘dominant worldview’, in which mo-
bility and technology are intimately linked to economy, can more easily
accommodate privately owned electric vehicles than car clubs, which
require institutional and behavioural shifts. Put in terms of the hero
story, a clever technology can save the day without need for behaviour
change [30].
The frustration found in some explorations at low uptake of EVs,
contrary to the ‘rational economic actor’ model, matches Lakoﬀ’s [24]
description of framing limiting our understanding. Some documents
going as far as trying to ﬁt reality into their system of frames, by sug-
gesting consumers need education about whole life cost of vehicles
[40]. However, the dominant worldview is not homogenous: there are
also explorations that acknowledge that a more nuanced understanding
of behaviour is needed; it is worth considering how to strengthen the
currency of those stories.
Electric vehicles now appear to have a promising future in the UK:
sales have risen sharply in recent years to over 28,000 in 2015, making
up 1.1% of sales [68], and they feature prominently in the govern-
ment’s recent Industrial Strategy Green Paper [69]. However, this has
not been a smooth road. This hero’s journey arguably began with the
realisation of the threat of emissions reduction:
[P]olicy makers have come to realise the diﬃculties in reducing green-
house gas emissions (GHG) from the transport sector, particularly given
the strong linkages between transport consumption and economic growth.
However, the transition to EVs is far from trivial, in terms of both
infrastructure and consequential changes beyond the technological
shift. EVs are a threat to some incumbent actors, through changes in
supply chains, the repair industry and fuel supply, and more generally
the risk of great change which not all incumbent manufacturers will
survive. In order to become acceptable to the dominant worldview, EVs
are framed as a straightforward substitution for internal combustion
engine vehicles (ICEVs), leaving automobility virtually unchanged. This
assumes behaviour to be ﬁxed and independent from technological
artefacts, whereas in reality, norms and practices co-evolve with tech-
nology [58].
A German study [70] suggests there are discrepancies between
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visions of the future based on sustainable electric mobility and strate-
gies rooted in the current regime: portraying EVs as a ‘techno-ﬁx’ could
jeopardise ‘deeper’ sustainability transitions to lower car dependency,
and moreover, this innovation cannot simply replace ICEVs without
signiﬁcant change, perhaps even redeﬁning the role of the car in so-
ciety. So, while building on accepted frames has gained EV narratives
legitimacy by building on expectations of continued automobility and
lowered emissions, these stories have played down both the potential
for greater change from electriﬁed transportation, and the inevitably
disruptive transformation process. This suggests that even if current
eﬀorts to electrify transport are successful, they might leave us un-
prepared for the future. This can be seen as a precautionary tale of not
appreciating the inevitable disruption and unpredictable socio-cultural
changes from technological innovations.
It is worth considering what is missing from the explorations ana-
lysed. One omission from both the main narratives is the possibility of a
post-car society. Indeed, even ‘peak car’ was not discussed in any of the
documents. The car club narrative suggests severing the link between
ownership and car use, retaining functionality of car journeys where
necessary. This goes against current trends, where the functionality of
car use as a means of transport is arguably declining, especially in car-
saturated urban environments in the developed world, although its
cultural value is still great [71]. However, others suggest the image of
the car has been reduced from an ‘icon of modernity’ to a more utili-
tarian perspective as ‘an ordinary piece of household equipment’ [72].
The omission of this entire debate attests to the strength of the con-
tinued automobility framing. While beyond the scope of this study,
autonomous vehicles (driverless cars) could aﬀect automobility through
shifts in car ownership and image. However, the technology in itself
does not guarantee sustainability in terms of CO2 emissions or access to
mobility.
Examples of broader stories missing from most explorations can be
found in the future scenarios of the Foresight work [54]. The potential
for technological failure, resulting in greatly reduced mobility and
transport no longer seen as a right, matches the horror story, the ‘tale no
one wants to tell’ ([30], p. 520). It is worth considering whether
avoiding stories of failure leaves us overoptimistic about the challenges
ahead.
There are limits to this type of study, such as the inherent sub-
jectivity of frame analysis. Moreover, each document analysed was
written with various audiences in mind (such as policymakers, industry,
or the investment community), and it is possible to read too much into
them. Nonetheless, these are inﬂuential stories which shape public
discourse about the future. If we do not question these stories, and how
they were made, they might leave us overoptimistic and underprepared
for the future. In Lakoﬀ’s terms, if we think in terms of the ‘wrong
frames’ we cannot fully understand the environmental crisis, much less
act on it. It is worth considering how to “[plan] the frames that are
needed in the long run” ([24], p. 79), or in other words, how we plan a
‘cognitive policy’ for the future. Some suggestions can be found in
Janda and Topouzi’s [30] caring story, which aims to create greater
engagement with the system around us and establish new social norms.
Here, this could imply actors supporting deeper change advocating to
policymakers and the public why a more sustainable transport system is
worth the eﬀort. This engagement with more actors, especially non-
incumbent actors, can broaden the ‘we’ who plan the future and include
more stories in public discourse. Alternative stories can take the form of
social innovation, creating new norms and institutions that help max-
imise the beneﬁts of ‘green’ technological innovations through re-
cognising their social aspects [73]. Social innovations for sustainability
often sit outside mainstream socio-economic narratives, and ﬁnd it hard
to gain support and legitimacy. Nonetheless, they could oﬀer much
needed alternative frames and narratives for planning for the future.
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